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**OFFICE OF PETITIONS**

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In re Patent No. 6,635,309  
Issued: October 21, 2003  
Application No.: 09/803,218  
Filing Date: March 12, 2001  
Attorney Docket No. **RDP001U**

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: ON PETITION  
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This is responsive to the "Petition for Suspension of Rules under 37 CFR 1.183—Request for Reconsideration of Decision on Petition under 37 CFR 1.378(e) and Petition to Accept an Unintentionally and/or Unavoidably Delayed Payment of a Maintenance Fee in Expired Patent under 37 CFR 1.378(b)/(c)" filed June 23, 2011.

The petition under 37 CFR 1.183 is **dismissed**.

The petition under 37 CFR 1.378(b)/(e) is also **dismissed**.

TREATMENT UNDER 37 CFR 1.183

The above-identified patent issued on October 21, 2003. Therefore, the grace period in 35 U.S.C. § 41(b) for paying the 3.5-year maintenance fee expired at midnight on October 21, 2007.

A petition to accept the unintentionally delayed payment of a maintenance fee under 35 U.S.C. § 41(c) and 37 CFR 1.378(c) must be filed with **twenty-four months** after the expiration of the six month grace period provided in 37 CFR 1.362(e) and be accompanied by: (1) a statement that the delay was unintentional; (2) payment of the appropriate maintenance fee, unless previously submitted; (3) payment of the surcharge set forth in 37 CFR 1.20(i)(2). The petition was not filed within the twenty-four month period following the expiration of the patent. This period expired at midnight on October 21, 2009.

The twenty-four month period for filing a petition under 37 CFR 1.378(c) is a statutory requirement and cannot be waived or suspended. See 35 U.S.C. § 41(c). The petition under 37 CFR 1.183 is dismissed accordingly.

TREATMENT UNDER 37 CFR 1.378(b)/(e)

It is noted that the instant petition did not address the deficiencies noted in the decision mailed April 25, 2011. Petitioner is afforded another opportunity to address these deficiencies. Otherwise, a decision on the petition will be made solely on the record as it exists presently.

A grantable petition under 37 CFR 1.378(b) must be accompanied by a showing to the satisfaction of the Commissioner that the entire delay in paying the required maintenance fee from the due date for the fee until the filing of a grantable petition pursuant to this paragraph was unavoidable. The showing of record is not sufficient to establish to the satisfaction of the Commissioner that the delay was unavoidable within the meaning of 37 CFR 1.378(b).

**Petitioner must establish that petitioner treated the patent the same as a reasonable and prudent person would treat his or her most important business.**

The general standard applied by the Office requires petitioner to establish that petitioner treated the patent the same as a reasonable and prudent person would treat his or her most important business.

However, “[t]he question of whether an applicant’s delay in prosecuting an application was unavoidable [will] be decided on a case-by-case basis, taking all of the facts and circumstances into account.”<sup>1</sup> Nonawareness of the content of, or misunderstanding of PTO statutes, PTO rules, the MPEP, or the Official Gazette notices does not constitute unavoidable delay.<sup>2</sup> The statute requires a “showing” by petitioner, therefore; petitioner has the burden of proof. The decision will be based solely on the written, administrative record in existence. It is not enough that the delay was unavoidable; petitioner must prove that the delay was unavoidable. A petition will not be granted if petitioner provides insufficient evidence to “show” that the delay was unavoidable.

Petitioner is responsible for possessing knowledge of the need to pay maintenance fees and the due dates for such fees, Petitioner is responsible for instituting a reliable docketing system to remind him or her when maintenance fees become due.

Petitioner is responsible for having knowledge of the need to pay maintenance fees and knowing when the fees are due.<sup>3</sup> The Office has no duty to notify a patentee of the requirement to pay maintenance fees or to notify patentee when a maintenance fee is due.<sup>4</sup> Even if the Office were required to provide notice to

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ambiguous with respect to the specific issue, the question for the court is whether the agency’s answer is based on a permissible construction of the statute.”))

“The critical phrase ‘unless it be shown to the satisfaction of the Commissioner that such delay was unavoidable’ has remained unchanged since first enacted in 1861.” Smith v. Mossinghoff, 671 F.2d 533, 538, 213 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 977 (D.C. Cir. 1982). The standard for “unavoidable” delay for reinstating a patent is the same as the unavoidable standard for reviving an application. See Ray v. Lehman, 55 F. 3d 606, 608-609, 34 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1786, 1781 (Fed Cir. 1995) (Citing In re patent No. 4,409,763, 7 U.S.P.Q.2d BNA) 1798, 1800 (Comm’r Pat. 1990; Smith v. Mossinghoff, 671 F. 2d 533, 538, 213 U.S.P. Q. (BNA) 977 (D.C. Cir. 1982). The court in In re Mattullath, accepted the standard which had been proposed by Commissioner Hall which “requires no more or greater care or diligence than is generally used and observed by prudent and careful men in relation to their most important business.” In re Mattullath, 38 App. D.C. 497, 514-515 (1912) (quoting Ex parte Pratt, 1887 Dec. Comm’r Pat 31, 32-33 (1887)).

<sup>1</sup>Smith v. Mossinghoff, 671 F.2d 533, 538, 213 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 977 (1982).

<sup>2</sup>See Smith v. Mossinghoff, 671 F. 2d 533, 538, 213 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 977 (Fed. Cir. 1982) (citing Potter v. Dann, 201 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 574 (D.D.C. 1978) for the proposition that counsel’s nonawareness of PTO rules does not constitute “unavoidable delay”); Vincent v. Mossinghoff, 1985 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23119, 13, 230 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 621 (D.D.C. 1985) (plaintiffs, through their counsel’s action, or their own, must be held responsible for having noted the MPEP section and Official Gazette notices expressly stating that the certified mailing procedures outlined in 37 CFR 1.8(a) do not apply to continuation applications.) (Emphasis added).

<sup>3</sup>Nonawareness of PTO statutes, PTO rules, the MPEP, or Official Gazette notices, which state maintenance fee amounts and dates they are due does not constitute unavoidable delay. See Smith v. Mossinghoff, 671 F.2d 533, 538, 213 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 977 (Fed. Cir. 1982) (citing Potter v. Dann, 201 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 574 (D.D.C. 1978) for the proposition that counsel’s nonawareness of PTO rules does not constitute “unavoidable” delay); Vincent v. Mossinghoff, 1985 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23119, 13, 230 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 621 (D.D.C. 1985) (Plaintiffs, through their counsel’s actions, or their own must be held responsible for having noted the MPEP section and Official Gazette notices expressly stating that the certified mailing procedures outlined in 37 CFR 1.8(a) do not apply to continuation applications.) (Emphasis added).

Petitioner must act as a reasonable and prudent person in relation to his most important business. Upon obtaining the patent, a reasonable and prudent person, in relation to his most important business, would become familiar with the legal requirements of

applicant of the existence of maintenance fee requirements, such notice is provided by the patent itself.<sup>5</sup>

A reasonable and prudent person, aware of the existence of maintenance fees, would not rely on maintenance fee reminders or on memory to remind him or her when payments would fall due several years in the future. Instead, such an individual would implement a reliable and trustworthy tracking system to keep track of the relevant dates.<sup>6</sup> The individual would also take steps to ensure that the patent information was correctly entered into the tracking system.

### **Application of the unavoidable standard to the present facts**

In the instant petition, petitioner argues that the above-cited patent should be reinstated because the delay in paying the 3.5-year maintenance fee was unavoidable and resulted from the failure of petitioner's prior legal counsel to inform patentee of the requirement to pay maintenance fees on the patent. Petitioner also argues that the patentee's ill health prevented patentee from filing a timely petition under 37 CFR 1.378(c).

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that business, in this case, the requirement to pay maintenance fees. In addition, a reasonable and prudent individual would read the patent itself and thereby become aware of the need to pay maintenance fees and the fact that such fee amounts are sometimes changed by law or regulation.

<sup>4</sup>Congress expressly conditioned §§ 133 and 151 [of the United States Code] on a specific type of notice, while no such notice requirements are written into § 41(c) . . . [T]he Commissioner's no timely-notice interpretation." Ray v. Comer, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21478, 8-9 (1994), *aff'd on other grounds* Ray v. Lehman, 55 F.3d 606, 34 USPQ2d 1786 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (Citing Rydeen v. Quigg, 748 F. Supp. 900, 905 (1990), Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 81 L. ed. 2d 694, 104 S. Ct. 2778 (1984)). "The Court concludes as it did in Rydeen, that as a constitutional matter, 'plaintiff was not entitled to any notice beyond publication of the statute.'" Id. at 3 (citing Rydeen v. Quigg, 748 F. Supp. at 906, Texaco v. Short, 454 U.S. 516, 536, 70 L. Ed. 2d 738, 102 S. Ct. 781 (1982)).

The Patent Office, as a courtesy tries to send maintenance fee reminders and notices of patent expiration to the address of record. However, the failure to receive the reminder notice, and the lack of knowledge of the requirement to pay the maintenance fee, will not shift the burden of monitoring the time for paying a maintenance fee from the patentee to the Office. See MPEP 2575, 2540, 2590. Petitioner does not have a right to a personalized notice that this patent will expire if a certain maintenance fee is not paid, as the publication of the statute was sufficient notice. See Rydeen v. Quigg, 748 F. Supp. 900, 907 (1990). the ultimate responsibility for keeping track of maintenance fee states lies with the patentee, not the USPTO. Since the mailing of Notices by the Office is completely discretionary and not a requirement imposed by Congress, accepting an argument that failure to receive a Notice is unavoidable delay would result in all delays being unavoidable should the Office discontinue the policy. All petitions could allege non-receipt of the reminder, and therefore all petitions could be granted. This was clearly not the intent of Congress in the creation of the unavoidable standard.

<sup>5</sup>See Ray v. Lehman, 55 F.3d 606, 610; 34 USPQ2d 1786, 1789 (Fed. Cir. 1995). The Letters of Patent contain a Maintenance Fee Notice that warns that the patent may be subject to maintenance fees if the application was filed on or after December 12, 1980. While it is unclear as to who was and is in actual possession of the patent, petitioner's failure to read the Notice does not vitiate the Notice, nor does the delay resulting from such failure to read the Notice establish unavoidable delay.

<sup>6</sup> 37 CFR 1.378(b)(3) precludes acceptance of a late maintenance fee for a patent unless a petitioner can demonstrate that steps were in place to monitor the maintenance fee. The federal Circuit has specifically upheld the validity of this regulation. Ray v. Lehman, 55 F.3d 606, 609; 34 USPQ2d (BNA) 1786 (Fed.Cir. 1995). In Ray v. Lehman, petitioner claimed that he had not known of the existence of the maintenance fees and therefore had no steps in place to pay such fees. The petitioner therefore argues that the PTO's regulation, 37 CFR 1.37(b)(3), *supra*, arguing that it 'creates a burden that goes well beyond what is reasonably prudent.' We disagree, The PTO's regulation merely sets forth how one is to prove that he was reasonably prudent, i.e., by showing what steps he took to ensure that the maintenance fee would be timely paid, and the steps taken in seeking to reinstate the patent. We do not see these requirements additional to proving unavoidable delay, but as the very elements of unavoidable delay." Id.

Petitioner's arguments have been considered but are not persuasive relative to establishing unavoidable delay in paying the maintenance fee. Section 2590 of the *Manual of Patent Examining Procedure* (MPEP) specifically states, in pertinent part, that:

... the patentee's lack of knowledge of the need to pay the maintenance fee and the failure to receive the Maintenance Fee Reminder do not constitute unavoidable delay. Under the statutes and rules, the Office has no duty to notify patentees of the requirement to pay maintenance fees or to notify patentees when the maintenance fees are due. It is solely the responsibility of the patentee to ensure that the maintenance fee is timely paid to prevent expiration of the patent. The lack of knowledge of the requirement to pay a maintenance fee and the failure to receive the Maintenance Fee Reminder will not shift the burden of monitoring the time for paying a Maintenance fee from the patentee to the Office.

While the patentee's ignorance as to the requirement to pay the maintenance fees is regrettable, the failure to pay a maintenance fee based on the lack of knowledge of the need to pay it does not satisfy the unavoidable standard of 37 CFR 1.378(b). As illustrated by the relevant sections of the MPEP cited above and throughout this decision, the patentee's lack of knowledge of the need to pay a maintenance fee does not constitute unavoidable delay.

Petitioner has not expressly stated that it was the responsibility of petitioner's prior counsel to track and pay the maintenance fee. Notwithstanding, if petitioner is making this assertion petitioner is advised that a statement is required from all persons with direct knowledge of the cause of unavoidable delay. Section 2590 of the *Manual of Patent Examining Procedure* (MPEP) provides that, among other requirements, a petition to accept late payment of a maintenance fee, where the delay was unavoidable, must include:

(C) a showing that the delay was unavoidable since reasonable care was taken to ensure that the maintenance fee would be timely and that the petition was filed promptly after the patentee was notified of, or otherwise became aware of, the expiration of the patent.

The required showing must enumerate the steps taken to ensure timely payment of the maintenance fee, the date and the manner in which patentee became aware of the expiration of the patent, and the steps taken to file the petition promptly. Furthermore, an adequate showing requires a statement by all persons with direct knowledge of the cause of delay, setting forth the facts as they know them. Copies of all documentary evidence referred to in a statement should be furnished as exhibits to the statement.

If prior counsel was responsible for tracking and paying the maintenance fees, petitioner is advised that that the inquiry as to whether the entire delay in paying the maintenance fee was unavoidable will necessarily include a focus on the actions, or inactions, of petitioner's prior counsel. Additionally, petitioner would need to establish that there was a business routine in place for tracking and paying the maintenance fee and that a failing in this routine resulted in non-payment of the maintenance fee.

Lastly, a successful petition under 37 CFR 1.378(b) requires that petitioner demonstrate that the entire delay in paying the maintenance fee—from the due date for the maintenance fee until the filing of a grantable petition—was unavoidable. Petitioner maintains that a portion of the delay was caused by petitioner's ill health. The renewed petition must be accompanied by documentary evidence corroborating petitioner's claim. This might include copies of medical records and/or a letter from the treating physician describing the severity of petitioner's illness. Petitioner must be careful to redact person information, such as social security numbers, account numbers and the like and this information may become public.

#### **Petitioner's Current Options**

I. Petitioner may file a request for reconsideration.

If reconsideration of this decision is desired, a petition for reconsideration must be filed within TWO (2) MONTHS from the mail date of this decision.<sup>7</sup> The petition for reconsideration should be titled "Petition for Reconsideration under 37 CFR 1.378(b)." If not previously paid, any petition for reconsideration for this decision must be accompanied by a non-refundable petition fee of \$400.00 as set forth in 37 CFR 1.17(h).

After a decision on the petition for reconsideration, no further reconsideration or review of the matter will be undertaken by the Commissioner. It is, therefore, extremely important that petitioner supply any and all relevant information and documentation with the request for reconsideration. The Commissioner's decision will be based solely on the administrative record in existence. Petitioner should remember that is not enough that the delay was unavoidable; petitioner must prove that the delay was unavoidable. A petition will not be granted if petitioner provides insufficient evidence "to show" that the delay was unavoidable. If a request for reconsideration is filed, it must establish that the entire delay in the submission of the maintenance fee was unavoidable.

II. Petitioner may request a refund of the maintenance fee and surcharge which accompanied the petition.

Petitioner may request a refund of the maintenance fee and surcharge by writing to the Office of Finance, Refund Section. A copy of this decision should accompany petitioner's request.

Further correspondence with respect to this matter should be addressed as follows:

By mail: Commissioner for Patent  
Mail Stop Petitions  
Box 1450  
Alexandria, VA 22313-1460

By facsimile: (571) 273-8300  
Attn: Office of Petitions

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A reasonable and prudent person would not rely on maintenance fee reminders from the Office for two reasons. First, the Office has indicated that such reminders are a mere courtesy and has reserved the right to discontinue such reminders at any time. second, such reminders may be lost in the mail. A reasonable and prudent person, in regard to his most important business would not rely solely on reminders that the Office may or may not send which may or may not be lost in the mail.

<sup>7</sup>No extension of this two-month time limit can be granted under 37 CFR 1.136(a) or (b). This is not a final agency action within the meaning of 5 U.S.C. § 704.

Telephone inquiries concerning this decision should be directed to the undersigned at (571) 272-3222.

/Kenya A. McLaughlin/

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